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Deregulation and restructuring have become
unavoidable trends to the power industry recently in
order to increase its efficiency, to reduce operation
costs, or to provide customers better services.  The
once centralized system planning and management
must be remodeled to reflect the changes in the
market environment. We have proposed and
developed a multi-agent based system to assist
players,  such as, owners of power generation
stations, owners of transmission lines, and groups of
consumers, in the same market to select partners to
form coalitions.  The system provides users with a
cooperation plan and its associated cost allocation
plan for the users to support their decision making
process.  Bilateral Shapley Value (BSV) was selected
as the theoretical foundation to develop the system.
The multi-agent system was developed by the
combination of IDEAS and Tcl/Tk.
1. Introduction
Since the late 1980’s, electric utility industry has
been facing the pressure of deregulation and
restructuring.  Two of the major changes were that the
owners of the transmission lines could participate in
the market to make decision on behalf of themselves
and the old boundary lines have been removed to offer
consumers more alternatives, for example, consumers
were allowed to purchase electricity from the power
stations located in other states.
As deregulation and restructuring have become
inevitable trends in the modern utility industries, there1060-3425/98 $10.0is a need for more efficient methods or systems to
facilitate a just and stable searching for new partners
(for formation of coalition) as well as a fair system to
identify the contribution from each participant (for
profits or costs allocation). Fortunately, there are
many game theory models that we can borrow to
develop the theoretical foundation for the multi-agent
system.
Deregulation and restructuring have been adopted
in several states, for example, California, and
countries, for example, Australia, market structure of
such states or countries have been changed
significantly.  In most cases, a more decentralized
system or negotiation infrastructure has replaced the
original system.  Since this issue was very important,
Wu et al. [22] have developed a decentralized
algorithm to optimize multilateral trading among the
participants.  For transmission planning, Bushnell and
Stoft [2], and Chao et al. [3] have shown that
investment incentives and market mechanisms have
been important to guarantee a fair and just outcome
Planning for expansion, either adding new power
stations or new transmission lines, in power industry is
a very significant decision.  The costs involved, in the
first case, can reach several billion US dollars. In this
paper, we assume that there are fixed number of
power generation units and fixed number of consumer
groups.  However, after deregulation or restructuring,
the original boundary lines have been removed.
Therefore, the consumers, owners of power stations
and owners of transmission lines have to work
together to search for new coalitions to guarantee their
long-term interests can be protected.0 (c) 1998 IEEE
Adding new power units costs more and takes
longer, therefore, the core of the planning problem is
modified or limited to the determination of the optimal
number of lines to add to the existing system.
Planning for transmission expansion involves the
decisions from the players, which based on some
scenarios, which include the network topology,
suppliers, customers, and/or owners of transmission
line.  It is common that when adding a new
transmission line, costs should be shared by all the
players who will be benefited. The decisions about
whether to add one more line or not and how to
allocate the costs is still an open research area.
This problem is very similar to the logistics
planning problem.  In which the numbers and
locations of the manufacturing plants or warehouses
and retail stores are fixed, therefore to design the new
logistics system, which include decision of the routing
of transportation and number of trucks, become the
core of the problem.  In other words, to satisfy the
demands of the new set of consumers with the lowest
costs to both owners of the transmission lines and
owners of power units is the goal of solving such
problem.  To solve such problems, the solutions also
need to guarantee that the other operational
constraints, such as, capacity of power transmission,
can be satisfied [15].
Several techniques have been used to assist the
planning of transmission expansion. For example,
techniques that based on mathematical programming,
such as Branch-and-Bound [5, 7, 13], techniques that
based on sensitivity analysis [2, 16], and techniques
that uses hybrids of neural networks and genetic
algorithms [13].  Normally, the planning for expansion
is combinatorial complicated and that  makes it very
difficult to find reasonable solutions within short
computational time if the number of nodes or number
of participants is large.
Using game theory to assist in the formation of
coalitions is one of  approaches to solve such
problems.  Gately used Shapley value to set up
regional cooperation for investment in expansion and
cost allocation [8].  Gately’s approach is a centralized
one, where a central planner is needed to be in charge
of  cost allocation.
Recently, researchers in Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (DAI) have started to study how
coalitions were formed and what negotiation or
bargaining algorithms were useful in helping people to
better understand the process of coalition formation1060-3425/98 $10.and design better negotiation strategy. Again,
cooperative game theories have been proved to be
useful.  However, there still a lot of works are required
to build systems which can support the negotiation or
formation of coalition in fully decentralized
environments [10, 11, 12, 18].  DAI approaches
address and solve some pending issues in deregulated
power transmission markets.  For example,
· Determining the members of coalitions and which
coalition will be formed
· Implementing a protocol to support bargaining
and negotiation
· Allocating total expansion costs to all the players
(agents) of the expansion game
In this paper, we propose and have developed a
multi-agent system to prove that some of the above
issues can be solved by such multi-agent approach.
The multi-agent system simulates the power industry
and models each player, such as, an owner of a power
station, an agent.  In the system, agents communicate
with each other, based on Bilateral Shapley Value
(BSV) to search for potential partners to form
coalitions where they can protect their long-term
interests.
The agents of this system have to work
collaboratively to finish certain tasks, for example,
determining the new transmission lines to add to the
system and forming coalitions to reduce the overall
costs. Each agent is assumed to be rational, that is,
maximizing its own utility, and to be an independent
and autonomous agent, who is not willing to accept
any plan that generated by a centralized planner [10].”
In section 2, we will briefly introduce the
software agents and multi-agent systems.  The network
expansion model, which governs the network
expansion of electricity transmission will be discussed
in section 3.  Coalitions and games in network
expansion planning will be discussed in section 4.
The process of decentralized coalition formation
among agents will be discussed in section 5.
Implementation of the multi-agent system will be
discussed in section 6.  This paper is concluded with a
discussion about the limitations of the multi-agent
approaches and recommendation for future research.
2. Software agent and Multi-agent system
With the advances in IT, growing complexity and
decentralization of the utility markets, and the00 (c) 1998 IEEE
increasing pressure to lower the costs have pushed the
demand for new tools or systems to remove the
burdens of human decision makers from those tedious
and repeating tasks. One of such applications is the
software agents. If software agents do have additional
capabilities, such as, learning and communication,
they can be called intelligent agent.  Detailed
discussion of about software agents can be seen in [14,
21].
Multi-agent systems are special type of agents,
which more focus on the coordination and the
communication among agents to collaboratively
accomplish tasks [10, 11, 12]. The agents in our
system are owners of power stations, groups of
customers and coordinators, such as, independent
system operators (ISOs).  The coordinator is a special
type of agent who coordinate and synchronize the
collaboration among agents.  The objective of the
multi-agent system is, therefore, to derive a workable
and profitable coalitions under the fair play practice
subject to the constraints and requirements of power
generation and transmission.
Communication and cooperation are two most
important capabilities to the multi-agent systems.
Multi-agent systems are designed to have the
capability to either, collaborate, for example,
decompose a problem and jointly solve the problem,
or compete, such as, search for the best deals for the
users. The term cooperation used in this paper is
assumed to include both collaboration and
competition.  Communication is vitally important by
which relevant information to support cooperation is
exchanged. KQML (Knowledge Query and
Manipulation Language) is a language that supports
the communication among agents [6].  However,
agents must do more than just communication.
Rational agents must be able to cooperate and
negotiate with each other. Design of the
communication and negotiation protocols is important.
However, so far there is no protocol that dominates
this field.  One language developed by Barbuceanu
and Fox [1] called COOL, which is an extension of
KQML, which allows agents to be developed with the
capability to make proposals and counter-proposals,
accept and reject goals, notify the other agents of goal
cancellation or creation.1060-3425/98 $13. Network Expansion Model
We used the simple example, a six-bus system, to
illustrate the planning process of network expansion as
shown in Figure 1. The limits of power transmission
and power generation are provided on the same figure.
The details of the model and example can be found in
[7, 20].
There are several techniques can be used to rank
the possible locations to add new lines to an existing
system.  For this study, we followed the heuristic
approach suggested by [15, 20], which is a quadratic
linear programming problem, to identify whether a
solution is feasible or not. The general formulation
can be expressed as:
min 1
2
2
1
c Pj j
j
M
=
∑ (1)
subject to
B K P PΘ + =T D (2)
B A PL LΘ ≤ (3)
where c j  is the cost of adding line j to the network,
PJ is the active power (in p. u.) flowing through the
added line j, i.e. the jth element of PD  and PD  is the
flow vector for the possible lines.  Also M is the
number of possible new lines, B is the matrix, whose
elements are the imaginary parts of the nodal
admittance matrix of the existing network, Q is the
phase angle vector, K T  is the transpose of the node-
branch connection matrix, P is the nodal injection
power for the overall network, B L  is a diagonal
matrix whose elements are branch admittance, P L  is
the branch active power vector, and A is the network
incidence matrix.0.00 (c) 1998 IEEE
The data for Garver’s six bus problem is
presented in Figure 1 and Table 1. The solid lines and
doted lines in Figure 1 represent the exiting lines and
candidate lines respectively.  The minimization
algorithm is run recursively until there are no
overloads, Pj , in the system. Although the optimum
value is not always guaranteed, the simplicity of the
heuristic algorithm makes it a valid first approach to
solve a highly combinatorial complicated problem like
this one.
Since the objective function (1) has taken into
account the effect of the power transmission cost, the
candidate line with the largest power flow is the most
effective in the expanded network1. Constraint (2)
expresses the total nodal injection power as a function
of the existing and the potential network (after adding
new lines) parameters, and constraint (3) reflects the
thermal limits of the existing network lines.
4. Coalitions and Games in Expansion
Planning
To solve the transmission expansion planning
problem in a decentralized environment, we treat it as
a cooperative game. The purpose of the game is to
expand the transmission grid with the minimum
possible costs, subject to the constraints (2) and (3), as
well as with a “fair” allocation of total costs among
the players based on their contributions.
By DAI terminology, a player is called an agent.
An agent in the game can be either a generator (a
power station), a load (a group of consumers), or an
                                                          
1
 See [20], pp.394-400, for a very detailed
explanation.
Bus
From/t
o
Cost
(Units)
Susceptance
(1/W)
Capacity
(MW)
1/2 40 2.50 100
1/4 60 1.67 80
1/5 20 5.00 100
2/3 20 5.00 100
2/4 40 2.50 100
2/6 30 3.33 100
3/5 20 5.00 100
4/6 30 3.33 100
5/6 61 1.64 78
Table 1. Six Bus Problem1060-3425/98 $10independent third party (for example, an independent
system operator). A typical agent in this research is
considered to be an independent entity: a customer
load or a set of customer loads, a generator or a set of
generators, or a combination of both. For simplicity,
we do not consider fractional bus loading or fractional
generator output.  We also assume that any set of
generation units and loads attached to the same bus
belong to a single agent.  Therefore we cannot have
two agents sharing the same bus. Therefore, we have a
maximum of six agents in the expansion game
corresponding to the six-bus example as shown in
Figure 1.
A coalition in this paper is defined to be a set of
agents and their associated transmission line(s) which
connect these agents. They must satisfy the four
conditions:
1.  There must be at least one generator, one load,
and one transmission line included in the agents.
2.  Generators have to meet the total demand, i.e. the
loads have to be always satisfied by the outputs
from generation stations plus the losses due to
transmission.
3.  Existing line(s) thermal limits cannot be
exceeded.
4.  There must be one or more transmission lines
(either existing or possible candidates) which
connect all the agents.
A self-contained single agent can also be regarded
as a coalition, called a trivial coalition.  Such trivial
15
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Figure 1. Six Bus Problem.00 (c) 1998 IEEE
coalition does not need not meet all the four
conditions.
Once a coalition is formed, then it will be
represented by one autonomous agent. Within each
coalition, it can develop its own expansion plan and
the expansion plan of this coalition can be determined
again by the minimum algorithm described by
Equations (1), (2) and (3). Figure 2 shows two
examples of feasible coalitions in the Garver test case.
When we allow generation rescheduling, that is.
the real power generation output can be ranged form 0
to the maximum capacity (150, 360, and 600 MW
respectively in Figure 1), the optimal solution of the
minimum algorithm for the grand coalition has a cost
of 130 units, and circuit additions are n26 = 3 circuits,
and n35 = 2 circuits.
We will use the bus notation when referring to
coalitions. For example, when we say coalition {1,2}
we are referring to a coalition that combines all
generators and loads on buses 1 and 2, and all the
lines that interconnect these buses.
5. Decentralized Coalition Formation be-
tween Transmission Expansion Agents
The use of decision techniques to analyze DAI
problems, like the one discussed in Section 3, started
in the early 1990s. However, the Shapley Value has
been widely used in solving such problems [17].
Shapley Value calculates a fair division of the utility,
based on individuals’ contributions, among the
members in a coalition. It is a solution concept for a n-
180
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100UNITS
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240
240
6 4
UNITS
120
240
240
Coalition of agents 4 and 6
Coalition of agents 2, 4, and 6
180
Figure 2. Two examples of coalitions1060-3425/98 $10.0person cooperative game. Shapley Value can be
considered as a weighted average of marginal
contributions of a member to all the possible
coalitions in which it may participate. It assumes that
the game is super-additive and the grand coalition is
possible to be formed.  Readers are referred to [9, 17]
for a more detailed explanation about how calculate
Shapley Value.  The mathematical expression of the
Shapley Value, is given by:
φi
S i S N
S n S
n
v S v S i=
− −
− −
∈ ⊂
∑ ( )!( )!! [ ( ) ( { })]
,
1
(4)
where, i is a player, S is a coalition of players, S
is the number of players in coalition S, n is the total
number of players, N is the set of all players, and  v(S)
is the characteristic function associated with coalition
S.
In order to avoid the combinatorial complexity of
Shapley Values calculation, Ketchel introduced the
Bilateral Shapley Value (BSV) [10, 11]. Klusch and
Shehory [12] adapted this approach for a completely
decentralized and bilateral negotiation process among
rational agents. In particular, the algorithm for
coalition formation they provided is also useful in the
power transmission planning.
Let S P A⊆ ( )  be a coalition structure on a
given set of agents A a , ,a1 m= { }L , where
C C C Ai j= ∪ ⊆ ,  and C Ci j∩ = φ .
Therefore, C is a (bilateral) coalition of disjoint
(n-agent) coalitions of Ci  and C j  ( )n ≥ 0 . The
Bilateral Shapley Value for coalition Ci  in the
bilateral coalition C is defined by
ϕC i i jC v C v C v C( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))= + −
1
2
1
2 (5)
Both coalition  Ci , C j  are called founders of C,
and v(C) denotes the self-value of coalition C2. Both
coalition Ci , C j  are willing to form coalition C, if
 v C Ci C i( ) ( )≤ ϕ  and v C Cj C j( ) ( )≤ ϕ (6)
                                                          
2
 Note that ϕ φ{ , } ( )C v C= , and v( )φ = 0 .0 (c) 1998 IEEE
In fact, a super-additive cooperative game is
played between Ci  and C j . Formula (6) reflects the
individual rationality and formula (5) implies the
collective rationality.
It can be seen that the founders will get half of
their local contributions, and the other half obtain
from cooperative work with the other entity. The
second term of the BSV expression, as in equation (5),
reflects the strength of each agent based on its
contribution.  Therefore it can remove the “free-
rider3” problem, which is common in value allocation
in transmission expansion.
In summary, the process of coalition formation
among agents is based on the approach of Klusch and
Shehory in [12]. The process has the following four
steps:
Step1. Self-value Calculation
Each bus is represented by one agent. Each
individual agent collects and analyzes information to
determine its initial self-value. Calculation of the self-
value determines the costs of line expansion. The self-
value of an individual agent should be the minimum
cost that the agent could achieve its goal. If the agent
is not willing to join a coalition, such as agent 1 and 3
in figure 1, the self-value is set to zero. If the agent
must form a coalition to achieve his goal, such as
agent 2,4,5, and 6, the self-value of agent ai  can be
chosen as
v a v a ai j i j
({ }) max ({ , })= (7)
For simplicity, we assume that an individual agent
can be included in some two-entity coalitions.
Formula (7) reflects what initially agent ai  will pay
for all the construction costs of the coalition { , }a ai j
to encourage the formation of a coalition. There are
other values for an agent to choose as its self-value.
However, the lower boundary of the self-value for
agent ai  is
min ( )
a Si
v S
∈
(8)
If the value of formula (8) be set as its self-value,
every coalition S a S Ai− ⊂{ },  is willing to form
coalition S with ai . No matter what self-value is
                                                          
3
 The free-rider concept address the issue of new
agents that take advantage of the work done by the
existing ones, without paying and compensation to
them.1060-3425/98 $10chosen, the algorithm can not guarantee that an agent
with non-zero self-value will be included in a
coalition.
Step 2. Communication and Security Check
Each agent sends its self-value and the candidate
coalition to an independent coordinator. The
coordinator will check the security of the coalition
according to the security constraints. If a candidate
coalition is identified to be detrimental to the security
of the system, the independent coordinator informs the
founders of the coalition to cancel the candidate
coalition. After security check, the coordinator
broadcasts the information of each coalition to all the
agents.
Step 3. BSV Calculation
After receiving messages from the coordinator,
each agent proceeds to calculate BSVs to rank the
order of forming coalition with other agents. Then
each agent determines individually a rational list, L, of
preferred agents to form coalitions, i.e. an ordered list
of local agent’s BSVs for two-entity coalition.
Step 4. Bilateral Negotiation:
for each agent:
(1). Initially, set i = 1.
(2). Sends an offer to the ith agent in the agent’s
preference list, i.e. L(i).
(3). Waits for replies and offers from other
agents.
(4). If an offer from the agent L(j), j i≤  is
received, i = j. If an offer from the agent L(j),
j i>  or from an agent outside the preference
list L has been received, replies a dissent
message to that agent. If no more offer from
other agents has been received, replies a
consent message to agent L(j) and informs
coordinator the candidate coalition with
agent L(j).
(5). If a consent message from agent L(i) has been
received, informs coordinator the candidate
coalition with agent L(i). If a dissent message
from agent L(i) has been received and L(i) is
not the last agent in the preference list,  i = i
+ 1 and go to (2)
for coordinator:
When coordinator receive messages from both
founders of a candidate coalition, informs every agent
to stop negotiation and removes from its own.00 (c) 1998 IEEE
preference list the agents within the candidate
coalition, and then go to Step 2.
When every agent reach the end of the list L and
no coalition is possible, the process terminates.
It is perfectly possible that two agents reach an
agreement that is satisfactory to both of them, but
which may be detrimental to the security of the
system. This is the reason why an independent
coordinator is needed to check and to guarantee that
the reliability of the system and quality of service can
be achieved. The coordinator is assigned other duties
in the process. It is responsible for gathering
information of the network and sends the information
to all the agents. In the process, the synchronization in
the multi-agent system is actually done by the
coordinator.
The process produces a coalition structure that is
a set of coalition trees in which the founders of a
coalition are the sons of the coalition. The coalition
structure is not unique for a given power expansion
planning. If grand coalition is formed, the coalition
structure will only contains a single tree.
For power expansion planning, the grand
coalition will not necessarily be formed. However, the
process do not guarantee that any individual agent be
contained in a coalition in the coalition structure.
Cost allocation according to coalition structure is
given by
1.  if S A⊂  and S is a root of a coalition tree,
the cost shared by coalition S is
ϕ( ) ( )S v S=
2.  if S S Ai j, ⊂  and Si , S j  are the founders of
coalition S, the cost shared by coalition Si is
ϕ ϕ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]S v S S v Si i j= + −12 12
Note that cost allocation is different from formula
(5) and the values are also different.
For the six bus problem, the cost function v(S) of all
valid coalitions and the self-value of each individual
agent is given by the Table 2.  The values are negative
to reflect the utility of expansion is cost.1060-3425/98 $106. Implementation
Integrated Development Environment for Agent
Systems (IDEAS) has been selected to implement the
multi-agent system to support coalition formation.
IDEAS is implemented in TCL (Tool Command
Language) with the Tk Toolkit for the X Windows
System running on UNIX platforms. An agent in
IDEAS runs as a separate process in UNIX. The
internal links among the local agents are made
possible via UNIX pipes while the agents establish
their communication with other known agents at
remote sites for cooperative works by TCP-sockets via
the Internet.
   Figure 3. The User Agent Manger of IDEAS
Coalitio
n
Value Coalition Value
1 0 {2, 5, 6} -334
2 -90 {3, 5, 6} -101
3 0 {4, 5, 6} -304
4 -60 {1, 2, 3, 6} -30
5 -40 {1, 2, 4, 6} -120
6 -60 {1, 2, 5, 6} -273
{2, 6} -90 {1, 4, 5, 6} -243
{3, 5} -40 {2, 3, 4, 6} -120
{4, 6} -60 {2, 3, 5, 6} -100
{5, 6} -183 {3, 4, 5, 6} -161
{1, 2, 6} -60 {1, 2, 3, 4, 6} -90
{1, 3, 5} -20 {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} -80
{1, 4, 6} -60 {1, 2, 4, 5, 6} -272
{1, 5, 6} -183 {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} -160
{2, 3, 4} -60 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} -130
{2, 4, 6} -150
Table 2. Coalition expansion cost.00 (c) 1998 IEEE
The User Agent Manger (UAM) is the user
interface of IDEAS where user can use it to input
parameters or view the outcomes as shown in Figure
3. Each line in the Local Agent List illustrate the
address/ specification/status of an independent agent.
Each agent can be activated or deactivated by the
UAM. UAM can send message to each agent. Figure 4
shows the self-value, the Bilateral Shapley Value, of
each trivial coalition of one single agent.
start
complete require
complete
require
refuse
 requirecomplete
complete
start
require
complete require
complete
start
require
complete
 coordinator   Agent 1   Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4 Agent 5 Agent 6
 Figure 5. The negotiation procedure of six bus problem.
Figure 4. Result of cost allocation1060-3425/98 $10.0The negotiation procedure of the six-bus problem
is illustrated Figure 5. When the coordinator sends the
START message to all six agents, agents begin to
negotiate with each other. For example, preference list
of agent 1 is empty, therefore it sends COMPLETE
message to the coordinator.  Agent 4 sends REQUIRE
message to agent 6 and it also receives
REQUIREmessage from agent 6
After calculates BSV and identify that the condition of
super-additive satisfied, agent 4 and agent 6 then form
a coalition.
After the coalition is formed, agent 4 becomes the
representative of the coalition, and it sends a
COMPLETE message to the coordinator. After that,
agent 2 sends REQUIRE message to agent 6.  Since
agent 6 already agreed to form coalition with agent 4,
it has to turn down the invitation from agent 2 by
sending a REFUSE message to agent 2. The other
reason is that agent 4 is before agent 2 in the
preference list of agent 6.  When the coordinator
receives COMPLETE messages from all the agents,
the process stop.  The coordinator updates the
information in its own belief base and sends another
START message to kick off the next round of
Figure 6. The log window of agent 2Figure 7. Result of coalition formation0 (c) 1998 IEEE
U s e r  A g e n t  M a n a g e r U s e r  A g e n t  M a n a g e r
A g e n t  A
A g e n t  B
A g e n t  C
B e l i e f - B a s e
B e l i e f - B a s e
B e l i e f - B a s e
U s e r  1
U s e r  2
T C P / I P
Figure 8. Simplified structure of an agent system in IDEASnegotiation.
The log file of the communication messages that
agent 2 has received are presented in Figure 6.  From
the log file it is easy to see that each message contains
the information about the sender and receiver, the
message type, the message reference number and the
priority of the message, etc.  Figure 7 shows the final
results of the coalition formation.  From Figure 7, we
can see the sequence of coalition formation.  In the
beginning, agent 3 and agent 5 as well as agent 4 and
agent 6 form the first two two-agent coalitions.  Then
each two-agent coalition in the second round joined
another agent to form a three-agent coalition.  Finally,
both three-agent coalitions joined together  to form the
grand coalition.
Notice here that no global agent or central
mediator exists. Each agent in IDEAS is autonomous
and works in a completely decentralized environment.
For belief representation and reasoning, each agent
maintains his own belief base which written in
BinProlog [19].  Agent plans can be specified by the
appropriate developed rules for message evaluation.
Actions can be defined in Tcl as well as in C. IDEAS
provides some predefined standard actions for
communication and managing the agents belief base
{1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 }
j= -1 3 0
{1 ,2 ,4 ,6 }
j= -1 0 5
{4 }
j= -2 5
{2 }
j= -6 7 .5
{1 ,4 ,6 }
j= -3 7 .5
{1 }
j= 1 1 .2 5
{4 ,6 }
j= -4 8 .7 5
{3 }
j= 7 .5
{5 }
j= -3 2 .5
{4 }
j= -2 4 .3 7 5
{6 }
j= -2 4 .3 7 5
Figure 9. Coalition structure, {{3 5}{{1{4 6}}2}}, with
cost allocation.1060-3425/98 $10.0etc. Figure 4 shows a simplified structure of a multi-
agent agent system in IDEAS. For more detail, please
refer to [6].
IDEAS provides a full range of features which
supported by a set of components which are needed
for building comprehensive and decentralized multi-
agent systems.  Such ability to support decentralized
decision making is the most important to our selection
of IDEAS to implement the multi-agent system to
support coalition formation.  The ability to support
decentralized decision making is the most important to
develop systems to simulate the restructured or
deregulated markets.  In which the players should
have the rights to evaluate and select partners to form
coalitions as well as to determine how to allocate
profits or costs among themselves.  Therefore,
determination of coalition formation and allocation of
costs in the new market are better must be done
locally.
The result of the cost allocation can also be
represented by coalition structure in Figure 9.
However, the process of coalition formation which led
to the final grand coalition may not be unique and
another solution is given in Figure 10.
{1,2,3,4,5,6}
j=-130
{1,3,5}
j=0
{2,4,6}
j=-130
{1}
j=20
{3,5}
j=-20
{2}
j=-80
{4,6}
j=-50
{4}
j=-25
{6}
j=-25
{3}
j=10
{5}
j=-30
Figure 10. Coalition structure, {{1{3 5}}{2{4 6}}}, with
cost allocation.0 (c) 1998 IEEE
7. Conclusions
The multi-agent system developed for this project
was proved to be able to assist in the decision making
for coalition formation and cost allocation for electric
utility industry.  The multi-agent is capable of making
decisions for coalition formation and cost allocation,
with very limited coordination and synchronization
provided by the coordinator, in a fully decentralized
environment. Furthermore, it is easy to implement and
to run on the Internet.  Therefore, the users do not
need to rent dedicated lines to support the
communications.  We could see that such multi-agent
systems can easily be applied to solve the problems
where formation of coalition is essential and the
environment is geographically dispersed, for example,
global logistics planning or coalition formation of
shipping and transportation firms.
The coalition formation in the multi-agent system
is a hill climbing process. In each step of the coalition
formation, the payoff for each agents to should not be
worse than the payoff of the previous step.  However,
such requirement may not be able to find the best
solution for all the participants, it may get trapped in
local minimum.  In our future research, we will test
other algorithms, such as, simulated annealing, to give
the system greater flexibility.
When the negotiation process reaches the end, the
cost or payoff for each agent must be allocated by a
recursive algorithm, which is based on the coalition
structure and the contribution from each agent that led
to the final grand coalition. However such negotiation
may not consider all the possible coalitions.
Therefore an agent who is willing to form a coalition
with some particular partners may not be guaranteed
to be feasible.  Therefore, how to give agents
additional flexibility, so that they can select partners
not purely based on the profits or sharing of costs will
be one of the items for us to improve our system.
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